Abstract-We examine the problem of deciphering a file that has been Huffman coded, but not otherwise encrypted. We find that a Huffman code can be surprisingly difficult to cryptanalyze. We present a detailed analysis of the situation for a three-symbol source alphabet and present some results for general finite alphabets.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the earliest data-compression algorithms is due to D. Huffman [4] . Given the probabilities of each symbol of a source alphabet, this algorithm produces a variable-length binary code which achieves an optimal expected codeword length among codes whose codewords all have an integer number of bits.
In this correspondence we investigate the problem of cryptanalyzing a message that has been compressed using the Huffman algorithm. but not otherwise encrypted. The Huffman algorithm assigns to each source symbol a binary codeword. This assignment, or encoding rule, determines the codeword set, which is prefix-free and so corresponds to a full binary tree called the Huffman tree. Edges in the Huffman tree connecting an internal node with its left child are labeled 0, and edges connecting an internal node with its right child are labeled 1. The codeword associated with a source symbol is the binary string obtained by reading the bits on the unique path from the root of the tree to the leaf labeled with that source symbol. For our purposes, the encoding rule, the codeword set, and the Huffman tree are different names for the same thing. We assume familiarity with the way the Huffman algorithm constructs the tree from a set of source symbol probabilities (see [l] or [4] for an exposition).
The source produces a message called the source stream, and the encoded version of the source stream is called the (binaryjjle. We show that depending on what the cryptanalyst knows a priori about the source and the Huffman encoding, the file can be impossible to decode unambiguously. This means that for all the cryptanalyst knows the file could have been produced by a different source than the actual one. In the absence of more knowledge about the source, the best that can be hoped for is a choice between two or more decodings of the file. We characterize the probability distributions on three-symbol source alphabets for which this situation occurs.
Manuscript received November 23, 1995 For n-symbol source alphabets we give a criterion for a family of geometric distributions on the source alphabet under which the file can be decoded unambiguously. We also present an efficient procedure that will choose which of two given sources actually produced a given file, if the file is unambiguous, or will give a proof that the file is essentially ambiguous, in the setting of an independent source. This and other results concerning independent sources depend upon conversions from Huffman trees to Markov chains and Markov sources.
To see a case of ambiguity, consider the three-symbol source alphabet {A. B . C}. In the source stream BABABAACACAA the most common symbol is A, so the Huffman algorithm will assign A the shortest codeword; for example, it may use the encoding rule
The encoded file would then be 01101101110010011. But this file is also an encoding of the source stream ABABABCACAD, using the equally valid encoding rule
So the file is ambiguous. The idea of using data compression schemes for encryption is very old, dating back at least to Roger Bacon in the 13th century [6, p. 901. The field of data compression has grown vigorously since Huffman's paper. Rubin [9] and Jones [5] discuss the ways in which data compression algorithms may be used as encryption techniques. Klein et al. [7] have considered the cryptographic properties of Huffman codes in the context of a large, compressed natural language database on CD-ROM. Motivated by the same problem, Fraenkel and Klein [2] have shown that the problem of finding the encoding rule given both a sample of the source stream and the corresponding sample of the encoded file is I\;P-complete. By contrast with [2] , where the issue is computational difficulty, we are concerned in this correspondence with the issue of information-theoretic impossibility. There is some flexibility in how the Huffman algorithm is implemented. We distinguish two cases of interest. In the first, whenever two subtrees are combined, an arbitrary decision may be made as to which subtree should become the left subtree and which subtree should be the right subtree. We call the resulting Huffman code an arbitrary Huffman code. In another variant, the subtree of greater total weight (probability) is always made the right subtree. We call the resulting Huffman code a right-heavy Huffman code. We assume that the cryptanalyst knows whether the coder is using an arbitrary Huffman code or a right-heavy Huffman code.
An implementor of the Huffman algorithm must also decide how to handle "ties" when there are more than two symbols of minimum or next-to-minimum weight. In this correspondence we assume for simplicity that such ties do not occur.
We assume the cryptanalyst knows the size n of the source alphabet but not the source symbol probabilities PI, p~, . . . , p,. It may be the case that each source symbol is produced independently of the previously produced source symbols, in accordance with the source symbol probabilities. We say the source is independent in this case. If the source is not independent, we call it adversarial. When the source is independent, we distinguish the case in which the cryptanalyst knows a priori that the source is independent from the case in which she does not. To make this precise, we assume that the frequency in the source stream of the ith source symbol is exactly p , . In addition, when the cryptanalyst knows that the source is independent, we assume that the asymptotic frequency in the source stream of any finite string w of source symbols is Pr [w] . Here
Equivalently, the cryptanalyst has access to an infinitely long file produced by the source. We justify this definition by observing that for any fixed U J , the frequency of iii in the tile approaches Pr [II:] with probability 1 as the length of the file goes to infinity. When we refer to an ambiguous $le, we mean the file produced by an ambiguous encoding rule.
It may sometimes happen that the cryptanalyst obtains "truncation information:" a given codeword set may be impossible because the file does not parse into an integral number of codewords. (For example, the file 00000 can be produced from the threesymbol codeword set (0, 10, 11) but not from (00, 01, l}.) In this correspondence we assume that such truncation information does not arise.
According to our definition the encoding is done with respect to the actual frequencies of the symbols in the source file, rather than according to some estimated frequencies that the encoder may know (say of the letters in English). Huffman coding is normally done with the actual frequencies. We note that using estimated probabilities is certainly possible, and would cause additional problems for the cryptanalyst.
Initially, we had expected the problem of "breaking a Huffman code" to be quite tractable. We were a little surprised to find that there is considerable ambiguity in this process. The techniques we present are capable of resolving the ambiguity in some cases, but in many others we show that it is "intrinsic." This correspondence not only presents techniques for reverse-engineering Huffman codes in many cases, but also presents numerous results indicating when our techniques fail-that is, when the problem presents "intrinsic" or "true" ambiguity. Such ambiguity is a blessing to the cryptographer, but a problem for the cryptanalyst, who must find other means of "breaking" such codes. (We leave this as an open problem.)
TI. THREE-SYMBOL SOURCE ALPHABETS
We assume that the source alphabet is { A , D , C}, and that these symbols have respective probabilities a, h, and c in the source file. When n = 3, there are only two legal codeword sets: CO = (0, 10, 11} and CI = (1, 01, O O } . We assume here that C1 was chosen by the Huffman algorithm to code the file, so that a , b, and c are the respective probabilities of 1, 01, and 00 when the file is parsed according to C1. When the file is parsed according to CO, the frequencies of 0, 10, and 11 are, respectively, denoted 2, y, and z .
A. Adversurial Source
In this subsection we assume that the cryptanalyst knows only that the file was encoded using the right-heavy Huffman algorithm and Region of ambiguity for 3-symbol right-heavy Huffman trees, adthat the source has three symbols. The source is adversarial; that is, it generates any stream of symbols in which A, B , and C appear with frequencies a, b, and e, respectively, but the order is arbitrary.
We give a necessary and sufficient condition on rational numbers U , b, and c, under which the source may produce an ambiguous file. Since we are assuming that the right-heavy Huffman algorithm uses codeword set CI, we immediately have a > Theorem I : Let ( a , b, e) be a probability distribution of rational numbers such that a > $ and c 5 (1 -.)/a. Then there exists an adversarial three-letter source with probability distribution ( a , b, e ) on the source alphabet which produces an ambiguous file, if and only if 2a -3c 5 1.
The region of ambiguity is shown in Fig. 1 .
Proof: Assume the file is ambiguous. Recall the definition of x, y, and z at the beginning of the section. The frequency of 1's in the file is
The right-hand side achieves a maximum value of $ when z = x = k, and it follows that 2a -3c 5 1.
For the other direction we outline the construction of a source stream with the correct symbol frequencies which produces an ambiguous file. First, pick an integer k large enough so that ba, kb, and k c are all even integers. The source stream will consist of blocks of k symbols each, of two types. The first type, when encoded according to CI and parsed according to CO, will give an equal number of 0's and Il's and some positive number of 10's. The second type will give no 10's and more 0's than 11's. It is fairly straightforward to construct such blocks given the condition of the theorem. Out of such blocks it is easy to build a source stream which, when encoded according to CI and parsed according to CO, To illustrate the construction, suppose that n = 0.6, b = 0.3, and Parsed according to CO, B1 gives ratios x : y : z = 10 : 0 : 9 and BZ gives 8 : 2 : 8. Therefore, the concatenation B1B2 gives ratios 18 : 2 : 17 and it is ambiguous. It seems fortunate that the necessary condition we arrived at by considering only the frequency of 1's in the file turned out to be sufficient, too. For a fixed n > 3 and a given n-symbol encoding rule, the frequency of 1's will give rise to a necessary condition for ambiguity. It would be interesting to determine whether this condition is sufficient in general.
B. Independent Source, Independence Unknown to Cryptanalyst
In this subsection we assume that the three-symbol source is independent, but that the cryptanalyst does not know this a priori.
For any fixed encoding rule an independent source generates a Markov chain on the internal nodes of the Huffman tree in a natural way. Here we are assuming the file is encoded according to C1. In this case the Markov chain has two states, 1 (= root) and 2. and transition probabilities p 1 1 = a, plz = 1 -a, and pz1 = 1. We can think of the transition from 2 to 1 as a 0-transition of probability c / ( l -U ) plus a 1-transition of probability b / ( l -a).
Parsing according to CO is deterministic, so the independent source induces a process on the internal nodes, 3 (= root) and 4, of the Huffman tree used to parse the file. This process is not Markov, but there i s also a process induced on the set of pairs of internal nodes, one from the encoding Huffman tree and one from the parsing Huffman tree. This process is a Markov chain, which we call the cross-product machine (CPM). The states of the CPM are (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3), (2, 4), and the relevant transition 
Using (I), we can derive necessary and sufficient conditions for ambiguity in terms of a, b, and e. In the following two theorems we give two separate sets of conditions, one for right-heavy Huffman codes and one for arbitrary Huffman codes. Proof: Assume that the encoding rule i s ambiguous. Then the encoding rule using codeword set CO = (0, 10, 11) with respective probabilities IC, y. and z is also right-heavy Huffman-consistent; that is, x 2 y and 2 2 z . Plugging in the expressions for 2, y. and z , from (1) and eliminating b, we get, respectively, c >_ (~'$1-22a)/(3-a) and c 2 a'/(. + 2), as desired.
The above derivation process is reversible. Thus if c 2 a 2 / ( a + 2) and c 2 (a' + 1 -2 a ) / ( 3 -a), then z 2 y and z 2 z ; and hence the encoding rule is ambiguous. Fig. 2 depicts the regions of ambiguity defined by the constraints on a and c in the theorems above.
Theorem 3 (The Arbitrary Case): Suppose a source produces t
C. Independent Source, Independence Known to Cryptanalyst
In this subsection we assume that the three-symbol source is independent, and that the cryptanalyst knows this a priori. We find that, as one expects, there is less room for ambiguity than in the setting where the cryptanalyst does not know that the source is independent.
Recall from the Introduction that the encoding rule is ambiguous if there is another source that, for any string w of source symbols, produces w with probability Pr [ w ] . Here Pr (Pr [uJ' Iw] refers to the probability of seeing w' after seeing w.) The last inequality follows from a' = z 5 T = 1 -a.
Conversely, if c = (1 -a) ', then the file could have been produced by a two-symbol source with probabilities a and 1 -0. Equivalently, it could have been produced by a source using the encoding rule for codeword set CO with associated probabilities LI-= 1 -a , y = n ( 1 -a), and z = a ' . A source with these probabilities really would use codeword set CO because a 5 (fi -1)/2 and therefore
Remark:
The theorem implies that any ambiguous file is indistinguishable from a file produced by a two-symbol source with probabilities a and 1 -0. Surprisingly, for every case we have examined, the same thing happens for alphabets of more than three symbols: whenever two Huffman trees are ambiguous with an independent source they both "collapse" to a two-symbol tree. y < . < L I -. I ; .
ARBITRARY FINITE SOURCE ALPHABETS

A. Independent Source, Independence Unknown to Cryptanalyst
In this subsection we consider an rc-symbol source alphabet and an independent source. We assume that the cryptanalyst knows n a priori, but does not know that the source is independent. Our analysis of three-symbol source alphabets showed that the region of ambiguity depends on the probability distribution on the source alphabet. We now consider the family of geometric probability distributions on an 12-symbol source alphabet. For the geometric distribution p , = m -' , i = 1, . . . , n, where e is a normalizing constant, we establish a bound on N below which the encoding rule is never ambiguous.
Let us assume that the encoding rule uses a right-heavy Huffman tree. When p L = c a L p l for a < i, each internal node of the Huffman tree has a leaf as its right child. We call a tree satisfying this condition a left-leaning chain. By the independence of the source, each internal node x has a fixed probability T~ of branching right. This is the probability that the next bit in the file is a 1, given that the bits seen so far, parsed by the tree, end at LI-. Lemma I : Let T be the generating (right-heavy) Huffman tree for an independent source. Suppose T is a left-leaning chain with n leaves, and according to the geometric distribution the leaf probabili- Proof Let d, be the depth of 2. By the left-leaning property, the right child of z represents a source symbol with probability ea"", and the probability of branching right is ad"
Therefore, on any Huffman tree for parsing the source stream, each internal node also has probability at least 1 -a of branching right, and at most (7: of branching left.
The following theorem and its corollary establish a condition under which there is no ambiguity. The cryptanalyst knows the number n of symbols in the source alphabet but not that the source is independent, and "Huffman-consistent" is with respect to this U priori knowledge.
Theorem 5: Assume that (1 -a ) z 2 $. Let T be an wsymbol right-heavy Huffman tree for an independent source such that the probability of branching right at any internal node of T is 2 1 -a.
Then the rightmost leaf (RML) of T is a child of the root.
Proof: Suppose the right child of the root is not a leaf. Then it has a right child LI-. At some point in the Huffman algorithm, x is considered to be a leaf with probability 2 (1 -a ) ' 2 f (see [l] ).
According to the algorithm, its depth should be I, a contradiction.
Corollary I : Consider an n-symbol independent source in which the probability distribution on the source alphabet is geometric; i.e., p z = cai-1 , where c = (1 -a ) / ( 1 -a n ) . If a 5 1 -I/& = 0.292 . . . , then the encoding rule for this source is not ambiguous. the generating Huffman tree for this source is left-leaning. Let T be any Huffman-consistent tree. We will show that T must be left-leaning, and the corollary will follow. By Lemma 1 and Huffman consistency, the probability of branching right at any internal node of T is 2 1 -a. But every subtree of T is a Huffman tree for some independent source. The assumption on (7: implies that (1 -2 f . So by Theorem 5, the RML of every subtree of T is a child of the root. Therefore, the right child of every internal node Proof: Since a < of T is a leaf, so by definition T is left-leaning.
B. Independent Source, Independence Known to Cryptanalyst
In this subsection we again consider an n-symbol source alphabet and an independent source, but here we assume that the cryptanalyst knows a priori that the source is independent in addition to knowing n.
We consider the following hypothesis testing problem: given the Huffman tree for the encoding rule and another Huffman tree, decide which tree is the encoding rule or prove that the file is ambiguous. This problem can be reduced to checking the Huffman consistency of a single tree, and the naive algorithm for either problem involves evaluating Pr [w] for all w of length n . Although nothing better is known for checking Huffman consistency, we show that the cryptanalyst can solve the hypothesis testing problem by evaluating Pr [tu] for O ( n 2 ) different U I each of length at most 2n. This suggests that the problems of checking consistency of a tree or determining whether a file is ambiguous may admit efficient solutions, where the measure of cost is the number of binary strings tu for which the frequency in the file is evaluated. We solve the hypothesis testing problem by reduction to the equivalence problem for finite Markov sources.
A Markov source, or hidden Markov chain, ( M , x) , is a Markov chain M in which each state s is labeled x ( s ) = 0 or 1. Starting from some distribution 7i on the set of states, the Markov chain proceeds randomly through a sequence of states whose labels form a binary string. Pr.w [w] = P r n . x , ?r [U)] is the probability that A4 will produce the binary string w.
An independent source is equivalent to a Markov source, by a conversion shown in Fig. 3 . Under this conversion, there is a state of the Markov chain corresponding to each internal node in the tree, and the label of that state is the label of the tree branch leading down to the node. The root corresponds to two states ( T O and T I in the figure), since branches to leaves implicitly lead back to the root. The starting distribution r7 is the point mass at either of the two root states. Theorem 6: Suppose an n-symbol source is independent. Suppose the Huffman tree T for the encoding rule is given along with another n-symbol Huffman tree S . Then there is an algorithm with running time polynomial in n that determines whether that file could have been produced by T only, could have been produced by S only, or that the file is ambiguous as to whether it could have been produced by T or S. Prooj? (Algorithm) . Parse the file according to both 2-and S. 
evaluations.
Remark: The problem of efficiently determining whether a given Huffman tree S is consistent with the file remains open. The naive algorithm is to to evaluate Pr [w] for each w of length n in the file, at a cost of 2n evaluations. The algorithm given by Theorem 6 does not immediately solve this problem, except in the case where Ms is minimal, i.e., not equivalent to any Markov source with fewer states [3] . The problem is that the witness strings for the tree T which was used to produce the file remain unknown, and even if T is not equivalent to S , the file may mimic S on all of the witnesses of S (we speak loosely of trees being equivalent instead of the corresponding Markov sources).
It remains an open question to determine efficiently whether a given n-symbol Huffman tree is ambiguous, when the source is independent and this is known to the cryptographer. As we remarked in Section 11-C, it could be the case that any ambiguous n-symbol Huffman tree is equivalent to a two-symbol tree. By extending the method of Section 11-C, we have shown that this is the case for n 5 5
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